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In recent years, the topic of corporate governance has
received a tremendous amount of attention in Italy. In
1992, the Bank of Italy began a major research project, the
goal of which was to analyze the extent of the corporate
governance problems facing Italian companies, both large
and small.1 Following completion of that project, the Bank
of Italy has continued to place the topic of corporate
governance high on its research agenda. Corporate
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1 The results of this project have been published in a series of
working papers of the Banca d'Italia and in four books: see BANCA
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governance is also frequently the subject of articles in the
popular press, a trend that may have reached a high point
in connection with the recent problems at Olivetti, the
Ivrean information systems giant.2 Perhaps most
importantly, the Italian Parliament is also studying
corporate governance reform, and its work will undoubtedly
be influenced by the work of the Bank of Italy, a highly
prestigious and largely independent Italian institution.
Corporate governance refers to the mechanisms and
processes by which corporations are governed. At the most
elementary level, corporate governance can be described as
the processes by which investors attempt to minimize the
transaction costs3 and agency costs4 associated with doing
business within a firm. Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny
framed the issue very effectively when they stated:
[C]orporate governance deals with the ways in
which suppliers of finance to corporations assure
themselves of getting a return on .their
investment. How do the suppliers of finance get
managers to return some of the profits to them?
How do they make sure that managers do not
steal the capital they supply or invest it in bad
projects? How do suppliers of finance control
managers?
At first glance, it is not entirely obvious why the
suppliers of capital get anything back. Mter all,
they part with their money, and have little to
contribute to the enterprise afterwards. The
2 See, e.g., Crolla Olivetti, i sette dubbi della consob, CORRIERE DELLA
SERA, Sept. 10, 1996, at 3. .
3 Coase's classic explanation for the existence of the firm in a modern
exchange economy focused on transaction costs. See R. H. Coase, The
Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937), reprinted in RONALD H.
COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAw 33 (1988).
• Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm,
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305 (1976).
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professional managers or entrepreneurs who run
the firm. might as well abscond with the money.s
Early academic discussions about corporate governance
in the United States focused on such issues as the merits of
the conglomerate merger and the hostile takeover as
mechanisms for controlling agency costs. However, more
recently, there has been renewed focus on the legal
responsibilities of corporate boards of directors, and the
efficacy of shareholder litigation as a mechanism for
controlling agency costs.
Serious comparative corporate governance is an even
newer phenomenon for Americans. Of great interest
recently has been the role played in corporate governance
by institutional investors, particularly banks in the United
States and abroad.6 While there is a tremendous amount of
debate about specific details, over the past thirty years the
broad outlines of a general consensus about corporate
governance seems to have emerged.
The structure of this article is as follows. Part II sets out
the broad outlines of the consensus regarding corporate law
that appears to have emerged in the United States over the
past three decades. In Part III, the lessons from the United
States are then applied to make a number of observations
about corporate governance in Italy.
II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
AN EMERGING CONSENSUS
A consensus appears to exist on at least four important
issues. There seems to be agreement among scholars and
commentators on the incomplete nature of the corporate
5 ANDREI SHLEIFER & ROBERT W. VISHNY, A SURVEY OF CORPORATE
GoVERNANCE 2 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No.
5554, 1996).
5 See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994); Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A
Comparative Examination ofGermany, Japan, and the United States, 48
STAN. L. REV. 73 (1995).
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contract, the need to control managerial shirking where
there is a separation of ownership and control, the political
sources of corporate law, and the need to protect specific
capital investments.
A. Measuring the Performance ofAlternative Systems
of Corporate Governance
While there may be a consensus on certain broad issues
in the field of corporate governance, there certainly is no
consensus about which corporate governance system is best.
In fact, there is not even a consensus about the appropriate
means to measure alternative systems of corporate
governance. That is to say, there are no formalized,
generally accepted criteria for determining if a particular
system of corporate governance is working or not.
However, by drawing on recent research in corporate
finance, possible empirical methods can be suggested for
measuring and comparing the performance of corporate
governance systems. Following the suggestion of Shleifer
and Vishny and building on the work of Zingales, the
performance of corporate governance systems can be
categorized on the basis of how well they impede managers'
ability to divert firm resources to their own, private uses.'
Investors who are confident that a particular system of
corporate governance provides a good level of protection
against managerial self-interest will be more inclined to
make investments in the first place. It is in this sense that
a system of corporate governance can be said to contribute
to the overall success or failure of a particular economy.
Comparing the variations among legal systems in the
size of premiums paid for voting stock, as distinct from non-
voting stock, provides one empirical measure of the
performance of a particular system of corporate governance.
AI; Zingales has observed, the fact that outsiders are often
willing to pay sizeable premiums for voting, as opposed to
7 See SHLEIFER & VISHNY, supra note 5. See generally Luigi Zingales,
The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange
Experience, 7 REV. FIN. STUD. 125 (1994).
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non-voting, stock suggests that there are high private
benefits to control, and that these private benefits are not
shared with outside, non-voting shareholders.8
Similarly, as Shleifer and Vishny suggest, if a corporate
governance system is functioning well, then public markets
for capital will function well. Firms will be anxious to go
public, because doing so provides a low-cost method of
funding projects. On the other hand, if the corporate
governance system in a particular jurisdiction is not
functioning well, entrepreneurs will not be able to make
credible commitments to outside investors that they will be
treated fairly ex post (i.e. after their initial investments
have been made). Thus, the fact that there are large
numbers of firms that are eligible to go public, but refrain
from doing so, indicates the existence of a corporate
governance system that is not functioning well.
B. The Consequences of Having a Non-functioning
Governance System
As Part III makes clear, according to either of these
measures, the corporate governance system in Italy is not
functioning very well. On the other hand, the Italian
economy is, in fact, functioning rather well. This raises the
question whether corporate governance, like corporate law,
is trivial.9 I conclude that corporate governance is not
trivial. The Italian economy has incurred enormous costs to
adjust, or "innovate around" its lack of a properly
functioning system of corporate governance. I argue that
the consequence of the absence of a properly functioning
system of corporate governance has been an economy
dominated by small firms, an inability to effectively
privatize large, inefficient state-owned firms, and an
inability to build modern capital markets, including
venture capital markets.
8 Zingales, supra note 7.
9 See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and
Economic Analysis?, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 542 (1990).
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C. What We Know About Corporate Governance
1. The Corporate Contract
It is well known that the contractual arrangements that
exist among firms and investors are necessarily highly
incomplete and contingent.10 It is not possible to specify in
advance (i.e. at the time an investment in a firm is made),
the problems that managers of a complex enterprise will
face in the future, with any degree of specificity. Moreover,
the need for managerial discretion exacerbates the high
cost of anticipating future problems. While there is some
debate about the optimal solution to the problem of complex
contracting, it seems clear that the rules requiring directors
and officers to treat shareholders "fairly" (fiduciary duties
in American parlance) are an attempt to permit the courts
to complete the highly incomplete firm-investor contracts.
Minority shareholders appear to be in particular need of the
protection provided by the fairness requirements for two
reasons. First, minority shareholders are, by definition,
unable to organize an effective political coalition to oppose
managerial actions that are adverse to their interests.
Second, the market for corporate control cannot function
when independent shareholder groups control only a
minority of the voting shares in a company.
2. Managerial Shirking
It is also clear that some mechanism for controlling
managerial shirking is necessary if a firm is to attract
significant outside funds. Whether the best such
mechanism is a robust market for corporate control in the
context of the highly dispersed pattern of shareholdings in
the United States, or active monitoring by institutional
10 See generally FRANK H. EAsTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAw 1-39 (1991); Jonathan R.
Macey, Corporate Law and Corporate Govemance: A Contractual
Perspective, 18 J. CORP. L. 185 (1993); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989).
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investors in the context of the more concentrated patterns
of shareholdings in Germany or Japan, can be debated. But
the fact remains that these mechanisms for monitoring
management are clearly viewed as substitutes for one
another, and that some mechanism or other is highly
desirable.
3. Corporate Law and Politics
There appears to be an emerging consensus about the
close relationship between corporate law and politics. In the
United States, everything from state and federal laws
governing hostile takeovers/I to the decision to leave
corporate law to the states,I2 to the details of particular
corporate law rules,I3 to the very structure of corporate
law,14 have been explained from a political or public choice
perspective. The economics of corporate law has been
infused with politics, and economic efficiency cannot be
used to explain either the patterns of corporate governance
or the ownership structure that can be observed among
firms.
4. Protection of Firm-Specific Investments
One of the most important insights of modern economics,
as it relates to the structure of the firm, is that the firm-
specific investments necessary for a firm to flourish present
opportunities for opportunism due to the non-simultaneity
of investments and compensation. The risk of opportunism
in firm-specific capital investments arises from the
existence of an appropriable quasi-rent.I5
lIRoberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and
Public Opinion, 57 U. ern. L. REV. 457 (1988).
12 Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the
Economic Theory ofRegulation, 76 VA. L. REV. 265 (1991).
13 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward An Interest Group
Theory ofDelaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987).
14 See ROE, supra note 6.
15 Benjamin Klein et aI., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and
the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978).
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Appropriable quasi-rents arise when an asset or an
individual employee, is so specialized in its function, or so
expensive to remove, that its value to other users is
considerably less than its value in its current application.
Klein, Crawford and Alchian illustrate the opportunism
problem that comes with firm-specific investments with an
example from the automobile industry.16 They point out
that the giant presses for stamping out auto bodies are
customized for particular cars. After a stamping machine is
customized, manufacturers of the presses are unable to sell
them to other automobile companies, because they can only
be used for the cars for which they were designed.
In addition, buying these presses involves a huge initial
(sunk) cost but only a small incremental (operating) cost.
The danger, then, is that an auto manufacturer will act
opportunistically by reneging on its initial contract to buy a
press from a press owner, such as by offering to pay only a
steeply discounted price for the auto bodies made by the
customized presses. The auto manufacturer could do this by
feigning some reason to renegotiate the contract, such as
claiming th~t the auto industry is depressed. Such behavior
is difficult for courts to detect. If the auto manufacturer
engaged in such behavior, it might only pay the owner of
the press for the small marginal costs of operating the press
and appropriate the press owner's huge sunk investment in
the original construction of the press. Oliver Williamson17
and Klein, Crawford and Alchian18 have used these insights
about the opportunities for exploitation that come with
asset specificity to develop explanations of vertical
integration in firms.
Vertical integration (i.e. control of assets by a single
owner) is "an effective method for reducing the scope and
impact of opportunistic behavior irr the performance of
16 Id. at 308.
l7 Oliver Williamson, Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance,
43 J. FIN. 567 (1988).
18 Klein et al., supra note 15.
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these activities."l9 However, as Harold Demsetz points out,
vertical integration solves the problems associated with
firm-specific investments far more easily for physical
assets, such as the press described in the above example,
than for human capital, which continues to belong to the
employees with whom it is associated.20 As human capital
becomes increasingly important in economic development,
providing incentives for employees to develop specific
human capital skills becomes more critical. Rational
workers who fear that any investments they make can be
exploited, will refuse to make such investments unless
compensated in advance. In various countries, different
legal and cultural regimes strongly affect the ability of
firms and workers to bargain successfully over investments
in human capital.
III. CORPORATE GoVERNANCE IN ITALY
A. The Corporate Contract: Fiduciary Duties and
Protection of Minority Shareholders
The well-known legal remedies that protect shareholders
from opportunism by management, or by controlling blocks
of shareholders, are non-existent in Italy. It is difficult to
exaggerate the extent of this problem. One possible
measure is provided by the incredibly large premium
(eighty-two percent) attributed to voting shares on the
Milan Stock Exchange.2l
It is one thing to describe the institutional details of a
particular system of corporate governance. While even the
process of description can be challenging, developing an
instrument with which to measure the performance of a
19 HAROLD DEMSETZ, THE ECONOMICS OF THE BUSINESS FIRM 19 (1995).
See also Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital
Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate
Changes, 1989 DUKEL. J.173.
20 DEMSETZ, supra note 19, at 19 n.9.
21 Zingales, supra note 7, at 125-26.
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corporate governance system is even more difficult. In my
view, one highly useful measure of the efficacy of a system
of corporate governance is the premium accorded by the
market to control shares. The right to control a corporation
brings with it the right to realize all of the private benefits
associated with such control. Large premiums for the
shares needed to control a corporation suggest that the
private benefits of control, including the ability to transfer
wealth from minority shareholders, are great. Such large
premiums also indicate that the protections for outside
investors in general, and minority shareholders in
particular, are weak.
Under Italian law, while multiple voting shares have
been illegal since 1942, since 1974 firms have been able to
issue non-voting stock (called savings shares "azioni di
risparmio") in addition to one share/one vote stock.
Ironically, savings shares were introduced as a means to
promote stock ownership among small investors. Savings
shares are entitled to a minimum dividend equal to five
percent of the par value of the certificates, and such shares
have a priority in bankruptcy over other shares equal to the
par value. In addition, dividends on savings shares cannot
be decreased by a charter amendment, nor can companies
reduce the bankruptcy priority of such shares. Moreover,
whenever dividends are paid to common stockholders,
owners of savings shares are entitled to an equal dividend
plus two percent of the par value of their shares.
The existence of savings shares provides a means for
estimating the value of voting rights in Italy because
owners of savings shares enjoy at least all the rights of
"regular" voting shareholders to dividends and distributions
upon liquidation. In the absence of preferential treatment
to savings shareholders, the price estimate of a voting right
would be the difference between the price of a voting share
and the price of a savings share.
Zingales studied the share price performance of all
companies having qoth voting and non-voting stock traded
on the Milan Stock Exchange between 1987 and 1990
(excluding convertibles). He found that even before taking
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into account the additional dividends to which holders of
savings shares are entitled, voting shares with inferior
dividend rights trade at an average premium of 82% above
non-voting shares. When the greater dividend rights of the
savings shares are taken into account, the premium for the
right to vote rises to more than 90%.22
This premium for voting stock is by far the highest in
the world. It greatly exceeds the world average of between
10 and 20% (the United States premium is 5.4%) and is
double that of Israel, the country with the second largest
premium.23 The very high premiums for voting shares in
Italy suggest that the private benefits of control are
extremely high. In other words, these premiums suggest
that the ability of controlling shareholders to exploit
minority shareholders is very high.
One example of the exploitation of minority shareholders
is given by the Finsiel transaction in 1992. IRI, a wholly
state-owned holding company, decided to sell its 83.3%
stake in Finsiel, a software company, to STET, the Italian
(state-controlled) telecommunications group. The Italian
government owned 100% of IRI, but "only" 53% of STET.
Small private investors owned the other 47% of STET.
Clearly the government could profit from control and
transfer wealth from the small private investors to itself by
causing STET to buy Finsiel for a grossly inflated price,
which is exactly what happened. STET paid 700 billion lire
for Finsiel, 50 times the company's earnings. This was
significantly over the industry standard of between 20 and
30 times earnings, particularly for a company that was on
the verge of losing its privileged ability to obtain
government contracts due to European Union ("EU")
regulations. Further evidence of overpricing arose from the
fact that Olivetti, an arms-length buyer, had made an offer
of 266 billion lire for Finsiel the previous year. STET stock
22 [d. at 126-27.
23 See Ronald C. Lease et al., The Market Value ofControl in Publicly-
Traded Corporations, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 439 (1983); Haim Levy, Economic
Evaluation ofVoting Power ofCommon Stock, 38 J. FIN. 79 (1982).
HeinOnline -- 1998 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 132 1998
132 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAWREVIEW IVoI. 1998
lost 20% of its value on announcement of the Finsiel
transaction.24
Of importance for this discussion is the fact that there
appears to be no adequate legal remedy for the sort of
exploitation of minority shareholders of STET that one
observed in the Finsiel transaction. No lawsuit was ever
brought against any of the participants. Indeed, it is not
'possible to bring derivative lawsuits in Italy.
A similar anecdote is found in the Fen-uzzi-Monetedison
transaction. Ferruzzi was an unlisted comp~ny owned by
Mr. Raoul Gardini, who also owned 42% of Montedison, a
company listed and quoted on the Milan Stock Exchange.
META, another in the Gardini group, was listed and
publicly traded, but Montedison owned a majority of its
shares. Mr. Gardini transferred META to Ferruzzi for
inadequate consideration (i.e. for Ferruzzi stock at a price
based on an artificially low, pre-1987 crash valuation for
Ferruzzi). In response to criticism in the press of this
transaction, Mr. Gardini replied that he would not be
judged by "Wall Street criteria." He also noted that "[t]his is
an [I]talian operation in the Italian context and those
shareholders who do not like it can leave it."25
These examples illustrate that there is no mechanism
within Italy for completing the incomplete contracts that
exist between firms and their shareholders. Control groups
are free to do what they wish. There is little or no regard for
minority shareholder interests, and the applicable
legislation is not effective in protecting minorities from
exploitation.26
24 See Zingales, supra note 7, at 146; Stock in Italy's STET is Sold Off
in Protest ofPrivatization Plan, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 1992, at A15.
25 2 DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, BARRIERS TO TAKEOVERS IN
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 'il 5.13 (1989).
26 Cristiana Ghezzi, L'abuso eli Potere a danno della Minoranza
Assembleare 3 (Nov. 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
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Derivative lawsuits are not permitted under Italian
corporate law.27 In fact, for directors to be sued,
shareholders must pass a resolution authorizing such a suit
at the general meeting of shareholders.28 As Roberto
Weigmann has observed, the formal, legal protection that
minority shareholders have under Italian law is more
apparent than real.29 Shareholders have the right to make a
complaint to the firm's internal auditors, whose only
obligation is to take the complaint into account in their
annual report. However, if the complaining shareholders
own at least five percent of the firm's shares, the auditors
must conduct an investigation and put forward proposals at
a general meeting of shareholders on how to correct the
problem if they find that the complaint identifies legitimate
problems within the firm.30 In practice, this is only a very
limited right as the officers about whom the shareholders
are complaining generally dominate the general meeting.31
Minority shareholders of at least ten percent of a firm's
shares also have the right to file for a court-ordered
inspection, which can result in the nomination of a
representative who can sue the directors for money
damages.32
The premium paid for voting shares is strong evidence of
the cost of the lack of protection for non-controlling
shareholders. The premium for the voting shares can also
be viewed as a discount for the non-voting, savings shares.
Still further evidence of the staggering cost of the lack of
protection for Italian non-controlling shareholders is given
by the fact that, in Italy, publicly traded companies are very
rare. During the 1982 to 1992 period, 1700 companies
27 ROBERTO WEIGMANN, RESPONSIBILITA' E POTERE LEGITTIMO DEGLI
AMMINISTRATORI 104-13 (1974).
28 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 2393 (Italy). But see C.c. art. 2373(3) which
prohibits directors that are shareholders from voting on such a
resolution.
29 WEIGMANN, supra note 27.
30 C.c. art. 2408.
31 WEIGMANN, supra note 27, at 112.
32 C.c. art. 2409.
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satisfied the listing requirements of the Milan Exchange,
but there were only 66 new listings of non-financial
companies during that period.33 Those companies that were
eligible to list were, on average, four times as large as their
U.S. counterparts (based on annual sales).34 In fact, there
was approximately the same number of firms listed on the
Milan Stock Exchange in October 1996 (218) as there was
in 1910 (210).35
The above analysis raises significant doubts about the
usefulness of improved disclosure as a means for solving
Italy's corporate governance problems. The lack of a means
to redress shareholder grievances, coupled with a highly
illiquid stock market, and the complete absence of a market
for corporate control, suggest that disclosure is not likely to
provide meaningful benefits to shareholders. More
importantly, the empirical evidence indicates that investors
in the Italian capital markets take account of the costs of
the corporate governance system when they purchase
shares. That is why so few firms go public, and why
discounts are paid for non-voting shares. In other words, it
appears that relevant information about the governance
system is already impounded into share prices. Disclosure
would not add anything.
The effects of the lack of legal protection for outside
shareholders are exacerbated by the prevalence of
pyramidal ownership structures in Italy. Such structures
enable a single firm or entrepreneur to control multiple
companies through mutual and overlapping investments.
Approximately sixty percent of listed companies are part of
corporate groups, and, unlike most other countries, even
relatively small companies tend to be part of such groupS.36
33 Facciamo crescere la Borsa, LA STAMPA, June 23, 1994, at 19;
MARco PAGANO ET AL., WHY Do COMPANIES Go PuBLIC? AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS 15-17, 19 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper
No. 5367, 1995).
34 PAGANO ET AL., supra note 33, at 20.
35 [d. at 14.
36 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: ITALY 59 - 60 (1995).
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In Italy, as elsewhere, particularly in Sweden, such
pyramidal ownership structures can be used to make it
more difficult for outsiders to monitor and control
incumbent managers. As has long been recognized in Italy,
the pyramidal ownership structure allows controlling
investors to obtain significant amounts of leverage. As
Fabrizio Barca has observed:
By spreading the voting rights of minority
shareholders out over a large number of firms,
and concentrating those of the entrepreneur in the
company at the top of the pyramid, this
[pyramidal structure] allows [the entrepreneur]
"to obtain control over the greatest possible
amount of other people's capital with the smallest
possible amount of his own." This way of
achieving separation puts the interests of
minority shareholders in all the subsidiaries of
the group at particular risk. These interests might
in fact systematically diverge from those of the
entrepreneur, whose interests are linked to the
performance of the group as a whole.37
It seems likely that these pyramidal structures are used
not only to entrench management, to disadvantage minority
shareholders and to elude capital market discipline, but
also to substitute for the absence of legal protection for a
contracting party. Membership in such groups helps
prevent opportunistic behavior. This is because the
controlling parties at the top of the organizational pyramid
of a group can force the members both to comply with their
actual and implicit contractual obligations and to treat
other parties fairly.
B. Managerial Shirking in Italy
An important part of any system of corporate
governance is some mechanism for controlling managerial
37 Barca, 1996, supra note 1, at 14 (quoting R. HILFERDING, DAS
FIANZKAPITAL (Europaische Verlagsansstalt 1968) (1910».
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shirking. As Michael Jensen and William Meckling
observed, investors will discount the price they are willing
to pay for a firm's shares by the expected levels of
managerial shirking.3s Accordingly, a firm must be able to
make a credible commitment to control such shirking if it is
to attract significant outside funds.
As noted above, there is no agreement among corporate
governance scholars as to whether the best mechanism for
controlling managers is a robust market for corporate
control (the U.S. model) or active monitoring by
institutional investors (the German model).39 But the fact
remains that the existence of some kind of mechanism is
critical.
There is no possibility of a market for corporate control
developing in Italy, regardless of whether there is any legal
liberalization, because of the prevalence of pyramidal
ownership structures, complex cross-holdings and non-
voting shares. As of 1989, only seven companies had offered
more than 50 percent of their shares to the public in
general. In five of the seven companies, voting control
remained in a small group, leaving only two, Pirelli, and
Assicurazioni Generali, as potential targets of contested
takeover bids.40
In Germany and Japan, commercial banks replace the
market for corporate control as monitors of firm
performance. This is not the case in Italy where banks hold
almost no shares in non-financial companies.41 Indeed, in
Italy, the state owns almost three times the amount of stock
in listed companies as the banks.42 This is not surprising
given that prior to June 1993, banks in Italy, as in the
United States, were prohibited from holding securities on
38 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4.
39 See supra Part II.C.2.
40 DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, supra note 25, at err 3.21, 3.27.
41 BARCA ET AL., AsSETT! PROPRIETARI E MERCATO DELLE IMPRESE: VOL.
II., supra note 1.
42 Banks own 9.9% of the equity in listed companies, while public
authorities own 27.0%. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 36, at 59.
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their own behalf. Shares could only be held under direction
from private or institutional investors.43 Further, other
institutional investors such as mutual funds and pension
funds do not replace the role played in corporate
governance' by the large banks in Germany and Japan.44
Mutual funds are quite weak, and there is little pension
investment because of the generous unfunded, pay as you
go system of public pensions.
All in all, there is no evidence of any active monitoring
or other involvement in corporate governance by any
institutional investors groUp.45 For these reasons,
constraints on managerial shirking appear to be non-
existent. There is no market for corporate control, and no
institutional investor group is willing or able to monitor
Italian companies.
C. Corporate Law and Politics in Italy
There is no reason to believe that the structure of Italian
corporate governance has been randomly determined.
Rather, as in the United States and elsewhere, it seems
likely that the structure of corporate governance reflects
the preferences of powerful interest groups and the well-
entrenched elite. For example, as in the United States,
industrial leaders are not enthusiastic about the idea of
hostile takeovers. .As a study on takeovers in Italy pointed
out:
The concept of a public takeover offer is not
accepted by the leaders of the [Italian] industrial
establishment. For example, Gianni Agnelli, the
chairman [now honorary chairman] of the Fiat
group, has said that public takeovers are not in
the Fiat "style". Cesare Romiti, Fiat's managing
43 DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, supra note 25, at lj[ 2.7.
« ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 36, at 59.
4S M. BIANCO & P.E. SIGNORINI, EVOLUZIONE DEGLI AsSETTI DI
CONTROLLO: GLI INVESTITORI ISTITUZIONALI (Banca d'Italia, Temi di
discussione No. 243, 1994).
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director [now titular chairman] has attacked the
notion of the broadly held company on Wall
Street. The Agnelli family, like other "old guard"
Italian leaders in business, have started forming
special limited partnerships known in Italy as
Societa' in accomandita per azioni (Sapa).
According to a comment by Franzo Grande
Stevens, Agnelli's lawyer, the idea is to keep
"outsiders strictly outside".46
Politics plays a more central role in Italian corporate
governance than in any other G-7 nation due to the fact
that the state controls about fifty percent of the nation's
medium and large companies, and about eighty percent of
the nation's banks as measured by deposits.47 It is well
documented that:
[T]he State has constantly made up for failures in
the governance environment of private companies
by providing them with a steady flow of resources.
The State has transferred large funds to
entrepreneurs to overcome situations of financial
distress, has bought out mismanaged companies,
has provided subsidies to realize delayed
restructuring, [and] has subsidized loans.48
Fabrizio Barca, an influential commentator on corporate
governance at the Bank of Italy, has asserted that the
political market can replace the market for corporate
contro1.49 In light of the fact that governments in Italy and
elsewhere have done a very poor job of allocating capital
and making other managerial decisions, it is hard to
imagine how this could be the case. In particular, since
politicians must, by definition, survive in a political market,
they inevitably will make business decisions on the basis of
how such decisions will be received politically, rather than
46 DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, supra note 25, at err 3.37.
41 Barca, 1996, supra note 1, at 12.
48 [d. at 13.
49 [d. at 12.
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on the basis of how such decisions will effect the
profitability of the firms with which they are involved. This
will lead to the politicization of everything from hiring
managers to plant relocations, to capital budgeting
decisions.
Public choice teaches that the occasional, well-meaning
politician who attempts to manage a firm efficiently will be
replaced by a rival politician who gathers more political
support by promising to manage the plant for the benefit of
powerful interest group coalitions.50 Thus as real world
experience from Bulgaria to Moscow has shown, it is not
possible for state ownership and control to replace private
sector initiatives in corporate governance.
Similarly, it would be wrong to suggest that providing a
bigger role in corporate governance to Italian banks will
have a positive effect on corporate governance structures.
Such a move might be defended on the grounds that it
would bring Italy into line with the continental paradigm.
However, unlike the situation in the rest of Europe, the
Italian banking sector is largely under state control. Since
June 1993, following the implementation of the European
Community Second Banking Directive51 and in conformity
with ED practice and policy, Italian banks have been
permitted to own shares in non-financial companies. In
1990 steps were taken to have Italian banks sold to private
investors, but as of now the voting stock in Italian banks is
often held by an unusual entity known as a "foundation."
These foundations are in turn controlled by central and
local governments, and it does not seem likely that these
institutions will move into private hands in the near future.
50 See generally, Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the
Firm and the Theory ofMarket Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43 (1988).
51 Council Directive 89/646, art. 12, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 7.
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D. Implications: The Italian Miracle, Firm Size,
Regulatory Avoidance, and Firm-Specific Capital
Investments
To this point, this article has documented the complete
absence of any of the basic features of a fully functional
system of corporate governance. There are no enforceable
fiduciary duties. There is a complete absence of protection
for minority shareholders.52 Also there is no operational
mechanism for outside monitoring in the form of either a
market for corporate control or institutional investor
oversight by banks or other institutions.53
Italy is a successful economy, with respectable output
growth a~d GDP per capita above the EU average (at least
until recently), and higher than that of the United
Kingdom.54 Given this economic success, one is tempted to
conclude that corporate governance must not be
particularly important. After all, if corporate governance
were important, Italy could not have done so well
economically in light of the fact that its corporate
governance system is so poorly developed.55
52 The very few successful actions brought by minority shareholders
are often due to the peculiarity of settings or to a loophole in the
otherwise tight majority principle, a loophole that ta.kes a toll on
directors only in small, unsophisticated companies (C.c. art. 2373 bars
shareholders who are also directors from voting on their own liability, so
that minority shareholders can authorize the action.) No authentic
departures have been found from the principle that directors can be held
liable only if the majority authorizes it. See Lorenzo Stanghellini,
Corporate Governance in Italy: Strong Owners, Faithful Managers. An
assessment and a proposal for reform, 6 IND. INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 172
n.271. .
53 Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Investment Companies as
Guardian Shareholders: The Place ofMSIC in the Corporate Governance
Debate, 45 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1993).
54 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: ITALY 166 app. (1997).
55 Although, it should be noted that the most recent OECD economic
survey has noted an important setback to the strong economic growth
previously evident in the Italian economy. See id. at 1.
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However, a look at the industrial structure of Italy
shows why corporate governance is unimportant in that
country. In Italy there are a very large number of small
businesses, defined as firms with less than 10 employees,
and a very small number of large or even medium-sized
companies.





























Corporate governance doesn't matter very much in Italy
because there are so few large and medium sized firms
relative to what one would expect.57 In other words, one
might say that corporate governance matters a lot because
56 Data provided by Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (ISTAT), a
statistical reporting agency of the Italian government. The data was
collected in 1988 and was supplied by ISTAT in response to requests
from the Bank of Italy. Part of the industrial structure of the Italian
economy doubtlessly can be explained by the fact that Italian firms with
more than 15 or more employees are much more strictly regulated than
firms \vith fewer than 15 employees. In particular, it is extremely
difficult to terminate employment in firms with 15 or more employees.
Codice civile [C.c.] legge 15 luglio 1966, n. 604 - Norme sullicenziamenti
individuati, legge 11 maggio 1990, no. 108 - Disciplina dei licenziamenti
individuali, in Giorgio de Nova, Codice civile e leggi collegate, 1997/98
(Zanichelli). However, this data does not explain why there are so few
companies with 10-14 employees, or why less than one percent ofItalian
firms have 50 or more employees.
57 Cf. F. BARCA & M. MAGNANI, L'INDUSTRIA FRA CAPITALE E LAVORO
(1989) (observing the relative paucity of medium and large-sized firms in
Italy).
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the industrial structure of Italy reflects the problems in the
country's corporate governance system. In the single-owner
or family-owned firm that dominates the economy of Italy
as in no other developed country, complex corporate
governance structures are unnecessary because individual
entrepreneurs have strong incentives to monitor and
control their own firms. Institutional investors, fiduciary
duties, takeovers, and protection for minority shareholders
are unimportant in the Italian context.
The striking dominance of the Italian economy by small
firms has two other advantages. First, in a country
dominated by very high taxes and incredibly complex, and
often nonsensical, regulation of business, small firms can
more easily maneuver lIunder the radar screenll of
regulators.58 For example, Pagano, Panetta and Zingales
found that after going public, Italian firms paid about two
percent more in taxes per year than before.59 This is likely
due to the greater accounting transparency enforced by the
stock exchange on listed companies.60
In addition to being able to avoid burdensome
regulations and to be relatively unencumbered by the
problems that plague the system of corporate governance,
the small firms that dominate the Italian economy have
another advantage. Within such firms there is a strong
incentive to make firm-specific human capital investments
in workers. This is because these firms, which are closely
held and often staffed with family members or close friends
of the owner, can make credible, long-term commitments to
employees that, in turn, provide the employees with
incentives to make such firm-specific capital investments.
Thus it is not surprising that most of the small firms in
Italy IIproduce complex yet traditional products, employ a
large share of relatively skilled labour with a flexible
organization and have attained through the years a more
58 Robert Graham, A Year of Corruption: Corruption has Become so
Peruasiue the Practice Carries No Stigma, FIN. TIMES, December 30,
1994, at 4.
59 PAGANO ET AL., supra note 33, at 32.
60 See id.
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stable and successful performance than that of large
firms."6l
IV. CONCLUSION
In recent years, comparative corporate governance has
focused on the systems of Germany, Japan and the United
States. This has given the impression that the only
alternative among rival corporate governance systems
exists between the system of bank governance in Japan and
Germany and the protections provided by the legal system
and the market for corporate control in the United States.62
If nothing else, a study of the Italian corporate governance
system shows that there are alternative systems. The
Italian system appears to be a failure in the sense that it
provides only extremely modest legal protection for
minority shareholders, and does not provide a mechanism
for constraining managerial excess, either through
institutional investor monitoring, a market for corporate
control, or strong legal rules.
However, the Italian economy, at least until recently,
was very strong. As noted at the outset of this article, this
raises the question of whether corporate governance, like
corporate law, really matters.63 This study of Italian
corporate governance suggests that corporate governance
does, in fact, matter. The Italian economy succeeded by
being able to contract around its systemic corporate
governance problems, but it has incurred enormous costs in
doing so. The Italian model of an economy dominated by
small, efficient family firms that subsidize large, highly
inefficient state-controlled firms is unlikely to survive
European unification. In addition, Italy's inability to build
modern capital markets, including venture capital markets,
will impose increasing costs on entrepreneurs.64
61 Barca, 1996, supra note 1, at 7.
62 See, e.g., SHLEIFER & VISHNY, supra note 5.
63 Black, supra note 9.
64 As this article went to press, the Italian government was debating
a new statute designed to reform Italian corporate governance. On
HeinOnline -- 1998 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 144 1998
144 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 1998
In the near-term, therefore, it seems likely that the
system will change. One possibility is for the banks to be
privatized successfully (i.e. taken out of direct and indirect
government control), and for the banks then to emerge as
the dominant force in the country's corporate governance
system. There seem to be strong political obstacles to
achieving this result, but it is possible that these obstacles
will be overcome, particularly if the European Union begins
to encourage Italian privatization more forcefully as a way
of opening up Italy's highly protected banking markets to
outside competition.
Alternatively, it is possible that the market will generate
credible, self-enforcing protections for minority
shareholders that will enable capital markets to develop.
While there are barriers to innovation of this kind, such an
outcome is not impossible. There are early signs that
change is occurring on both of these fronts, so there is some
reason to be optimistic about the future of corporate
governance in Italy.
February 12, 1998, the newspaper La Republica reported that the Italian
House (Camera) had approved these reforms, which are collectively
referred to as the Draghi proposal. The most important aspects of these
reforms are that it would simplify the procedures for making an
unsolicited tender offer for a publicly held Italian company. In
particular, the reforms would require that any bid for a certain threshold
percentage of the shares of a target firm (which is likely to be set at 30
percent) must be extended to 100% of the shareholders. The original
proposal would have permitted minority shareholders with 5% of a firm's
stock to bring a form of derivative lawsuit (azione di responsibilit;R). But
the threshold has been raised, and the rights significantly diluted. See
La Repubblica.it, "Bozza Draghi Disco Verde "Entusiasta" della Camera"
http.:llwww.repubblica.itJcgi-binlprima.cgi?dday=980212&sez=EC&name
=23BOZZA; II Sole 24 Ore On Line Quaddemo, "Le Proposte di Modifica"
http://www.ilsole24ore.itJquademilcglmodifica.htm.
